This YARA rule targets the VirShield packer, a tool frequently used by threat actors to compress and protect malicious payloads, often with password-based encryption, to evade static analysis and signature-based detection. Proactively hunting for this specific packer in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify potentially obfuscated malware artifacts early in the kill chain, reducing the time to detect and isolate compromised endpoints before the payload is fully executed.
rule WWPACKv305c4UnextrPasswcheckVirshield
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 03 05 C0 1B B8 [2] 8C CA 03 D0 8C C9 81 C1 [2] 51 B9 [2] 51 06 06 B1 ?? 51 8C D3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Automated Deployment of Password-Protected Archives via SCCM/Intune
.zip or .7z files (often using WinRAR or 7-Zip) to prevent users from inspecting the contents before authentication. The YARA rule detects the WWPACK signature within the compressed container, flagging it as a potential virus shield or packed executable.\\<SCCM_Server>\SoftwareDistribution\, C:\Windows\IntuneManagementExtension\) or exclude processes originating from ccmexec.exe or IntuneManagementAgent.exe when the file extension is .zip, .7z, or .rar and the password attribute is set.Scenario: Legitimate Use of WinRAR/7-Zip for Backup Rotation
WWPACK string is a known signature for WinRAR’s compression algorithm. When these archives are scanned by the EDR/AV agent during real-time protection, the rule triggers because the file is a compressed, password-protected container..rar, .zip, or .7z that are owned by service accounts (e.g., BackupServiceAccount) and located in designated backup directories (e.g., D:\Backups\, \\<NAS_Share>\Backups\). Alternatively, exclude if the parent process is WinRAR.exe or `7z.exe