This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries leveraging the specific malware signature identified by the XtremeProtectorv106 YARA rule to detect early-stage infection or reconnaissance activities within the environment. Proactively hunting for this indicator in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate low-severity alerts that may represent initial footholds, ensuring rapid containment before potential lateral movement occurs.
rule XtremeProtectorv106
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { B8 [3] 00 B9 75 [2] 00 50 51 E8 05 00 00 00 E9 4A 01 00 00 60 8B 74 24 24 8B 7C 24 28 FC B2 80 8A 06 46 88 07 47 BB 02 00 00 00 02 D2 75 05 8A 16 46 12 D2 73 EA 02 D2 75 05 8A 16 46 12 D2 73 4F 33 C0 02 D2 75 05 8A 16 46 12 D2 0F 83 DF 00 00 00 02 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the XtremeProtectorv106 detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Antivirus Engine Self-Protection Scans
C:\Program Files\XtremeProtector). During this process, the scanner’s service executable (rtvscan64.exe or MsMpEng.exe) spawns child processes that load dynamic libraries (.dll) matching the YARA signature patterns intended for threat detection.rtvscan64.exe or MsMpEng.exe AND the File Path contains \Program Files\XtremeProtector\.Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
ccmsetup.exe or WindowsUpdate) extracts temporary installer archives that contain signed binaries identical to those flagged by the rule, triggering an alert before the full installation completes.ccmsetup.exe or Microsoft.WindowsUpdate.Orchestrator.Client.Scenario: Database Backup Routine by SQL Agent