yodasProtector10xAshkbizDanehkar

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential malicious file execution or presence based on the specific YODAS Protector signature, indicating an adversary attempting to establish a foothold through known security tool artifacts. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to validate whether these detections represent legitimate security operations or early-stage adversory activity that requires deeper investigation despite its low severity rating.

YARA Rule

rule yodasProtector10xAshkbizDanehkar
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 55 8B EC 53 56 57 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the yodasProtector10xAshkbizDanehkar detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Microsoft Defender Antivirus Real-Time Scanning

  • Context: The YARA rule may match legitimate scanning processes where the Microsoft Defender service (MsMpEng.exe) scans executable files in real-time. This often triggers when a user opens a large document or application, causing the antivirus engine to spawn child processes that match the signature logic of yodasProtector.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the parent process name and path. Exclude any event where ParentProcessName equals MsMpEng.exe AND ProcessPath contains \Program Files\Windows Defender\.

• Scenario: Scheduled System Backup via Veeam Agent

  • Context: During nightly maintenance windows, the Veeam Agent for Windows (VeeamAgentService.exe) performs incremental backups. The rule might flag the backup agent’s temporary extraction of compressed archives or the execution of its internal updater component as a potential threat due to file I/O patterns similar to the target signature.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Add a time-based exclusion for events occurring between 01:00 and 05:00 (local server time) where ProcessName is VeeamAgentService.exe. Alternatively, exclude specific paths like C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication\Workstation\.

• Scenario: Office 365 Click-to-Run Updates

  • Context: The Microsoft Office Click-to-Run service (OfficeClickToRun.exe) frequently downloads and installs updates in the background. When it extracts update packages or modifies registry keys, the file system activity can trigger the Y