yodasProtectorV102AshkbizDanehkar

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential malicious activity associated with the specific YARA signature “yodasProtectorV102AshkbizDanehkar,” which may indicate the presence of a targeted threat or known artifact within the environment. Although currently flagged as low severity, proactively hunting for this signal in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate its context and uncover early-stage indicators that could evolve into higher-impact incidents if left unmonitored.

YARA Rule

rule yodasProtectorV102AshkbizDanehkar
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? BB 55 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 8F 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 82 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 B8 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 AB 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 83 FB 55 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 75 2E E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? C3 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 23 3F 42 00 8B D5 81 C2 72 3F 42 00 52 E8 01 00 00 00 C3 C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 0E 00 00 00 E8 D1 FF FF FF C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 CC C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 4B CC C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 DB B9 3A 66 42 00 81 E9 1D 40 42 00 8B D5 81 C2 1D 40 42 00 8D 3A 8B F7 33 C0 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 17 00 00 00 90 90 90 E9 C3 1F 00 00 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 43 CC C3 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the yodasProtectorV102AshkbizDanehkar YARA rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Endpoint Protection Scans

  • Context: The rule triggers when the native antivirus engine (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus or Symantec Endpoint Protection) performs its scheduled daily deep scan. During this process, the AV engine spawns temporary worker processes that load signature databases matching the YARA pattern’s byte sequences.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a process exclusion for MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender) and Rtvscan64.exe (Symantec). Additionally, exclude file paths within the %ProgramFiles%\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\MsSmtpHost directory to ignore signature database updates.

• Scenario: Software Deployment via Configuration Management

  • Context: During a standard patching cycle, tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ansible push new application binaries to endpoints. The deployment agent extracts compressed archives containing the specific binary structure detected by the rule, causing a spike in alerts during business hours (09:00–17:00).
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based filter to suppress alerts generated between 02:00 and 06:00 UTC when maintenance windows are active. Alternatively, exclude processes running under the SMSSVC (SCCM Service) user context from triggering this rule.

• Scenario: Legacy Reporting Tool Execution

  • Context: A scheduled job for a legacy business intelligence tool (e.g., Tableau Server or SAP BusinessObjects) executes a nightly data aggregation script. This script utilizes a specific DLL or executable that shares the same header signature as the threat profile defined in `y