yodasProtectorV1033AshkbizDanehkar

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential malware activity matching the specific signature of the “yodasProtectorV1033AshkbizDanehkar” YARA rule within Azure Sentinel’s security logs. Although currently flagged with low severity, proactively hunting for this indicator allows the SOC team to validate its presence across endpoints and prevent silent lateral movement before it escalates into a critical incident.

YARA Rule

rule yodasProtectorV1033AshkbizDanehkar
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? BB 55 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 8E 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 81 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 B7 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 AA 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 83 FB 55 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 75 2D E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 07 E2 40 00 8B D5 81 C2 56 E2 40 00 52 E8 01 00 00 00 C3 C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? E8 0E 00 00 00 E8 D1 FF FF FF C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 CC C3 E8 03 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 64 FF 30 64 89 20 4B CC C3 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the yodasProtectorV1033AshkbizDanehkar detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters:

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM)

  • Context: The YARA rule likely flags the yodasProtector executable or its associated process tree. During nightly maintenance windows, MECM pushes updated definition files to endpoints, triggering a new instance of the protector service that matches the detection logic.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Process Name (yodasProtector.exe) combined with the Parent Process being ccmexec.exe (Configuration Manager) or wuauserv.exe (Windows Update), restricted to the specific time window of 01:00–04:00 UTC.

• Scenario: Enterprise Backup Agent Scanning via Veeam or Commvault

  • Context: When backup agents (e.g., VeeamAgent.exe or CommServe) scan the system directory where the Yodas Protector is installed, they often spawn child processes to verify file integrity. These child processes may inherit attributes that trigger the rule as a “new” or “suspicious” execution of the protector component.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the Initiating Process belongs to known backup services (e.g., VeeamAgent.exe, commagent.exe) and the File Path resides within the standard installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Yodas\Protector).

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via Ansible or PowerShell DSC

  • Context: During infrastructure-as-code deployments, automation tools like Ansible Tower or PowerShell Desired State