This detection identifies potential supply chain compromises or malicious document distribution by flagging files matching the specific signature of ZipWorx Technologies’ secure executable within the Azure Sentinel environment. Proactive hunting for this indicator is essential to validate legitimate software usage and distinguish it from adversary attempts to leverage trusted vendor artifacts as a cover for lateral movement or initial access attacks.
rule ZipWorxSecureEXEv25ZipWORXTechnologiesLLC
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E9 B8 00 00 00 [12] 00 00 00 00 00 [10] 00 53 65 63 75 72 65 45 58 45 20 45 78 65 63 75 74 61 62 6C 65 20 46 69 6C 65 20 50 72 6F 74 65 63 74 6F 72 0D 0A 43 6F 70 79 72 69 67 68 74 28 63 29 20 32 30 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ZipWorxSecureEXEv25 detection rule, including recommended filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup Archiving via Windows Task Scheduler
Task Name: Daily_Doc_Archive) that invokes the ZipWorx executable to compress departmental reports into .zip files before moving them to an Azure Blob Storage container. The YARA rule triggers because the process creates temporary zip streams in the %TEMP% directory, mimicking suspicious archive creation behavior.C:\Program Files\ZipWorx Technologies\SecureEXE\bin\ZwArchive.exe. Additionally, exclude processes where the parent process is svchost.exe (specifically the “Task Scheduler” service) and the command line contains -task Daily_Doc_Archive.Scenario: Deployment of Software Updates via SCCM/Intune
ccmsetup.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.Intune.AgentService. The exclusion logic should target the specific hash of the ZipWorx executable version 25.x (SHA256: [Insert_Hash]) when running under these parent processes.**Scenario: User-Initiated Document Merging in Shared